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AGENCY
JAMES F. DREHER*
Whenever collections on an account between a mortgagor
and a mortgagee are handled by a third person, he is the
agent for one or the other, never for both. Whenever the
collector puts collected funds into his pocket, one of two inno-
cent parties must suffer and justice dictates that it should be
the one who made it possible for the loss to occur. That per-
son, in these mortgage collection cases, is the one whose agent
the defalcating collector was. That is a simple sounding
proposition, but in its application the rule can present as per-
plexing problems as are to be found in any other single type
of case. And the sad part is that these cases always come
in bunches.
The first of what will likely be a new bunch is Twitty v.
HcrrisoW, in which we once again have the classic case of
a trusted lawyer taking a note and real estate mortgage from
an innocent borrower, procuring its sale and assignment to
an innocent investor, following the practice (apparently at
no one's specific suggestion) of making collections of prin-
cipal and interest from the borrower and remitting them to
the lender, and then making some collections which are never
remitted. In solving the problem in the Twitty case, the court
recognized, as it has done in all of such cases in recent years,
that no hard and fast rule of law can determine the issue.
Principles of agency are, of course, at the heart of the prob-
lem, but these cases cannot be decided on legal rules alone.
Different aspects of different equities appear in each succes-
sive case and there is no way of avoiding the necessity of
deciding each case on its own facts and its own equities.
In this latest case the Court affirmed the Circuit Judge's
finding that the lawyer was the agent of the mortgage as-
signee. The decision was rested altogether upon the actual
authority of the agent rather than his apparent authority,
actual authority being found in the established course of
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dealing which the lawyer had with this investor and in some
admissions which she made on the stand. The decision seems
sound, but it would probably have seemed just as sound had it
gone the other way.
Taylor v. U. S. Casualty Co. 2 involved the question of
whether a "producer of record" who submits an application
for automobile liability insurance through the Assigned Risk
Plan becomes the agent of the insurance company to whom
the coverage is assigned. The Court held that none of the nor-
mal mechanics of the handling of the application can make
the local insurance agent who originates the application for
assigned risk insurance the agent of the company eventually
writing the policy, but that the company can make him its
apparent agent by sending him the policy to deliver.
The "producer of record" is the person, usually an insurance
agent, who takes an application for liability insurance, to
conform with the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
from a person who cannot obtain insurance through the nor-
mal channels and submits that application with a deposit
on the premium to the clearing house of the Assigned Risk
Plan for assignment to one of the companies which are re-
quired to operate the Plan. The status of "producer of rec-
ord" is primarily for the purpose of giving the producer a
commission on the premium, if and when the policy is placed.
The Court held in the Taylor case that nothing which oc-
curred up to the time of the delivery of the policy could have
made the producer of record the agent of the insurance com-
pany which accepted the coverage since throughout the whole
of the transaction the identity of that company was unknown.
The Court held, however, that the issuing company could
have delivered the policy to the insured and collected the pre-
mium from him directly rather than through the producer
of record; that when it chose to send the policy to the pro-
ducer for delivery it clothed him with such appearances of
authority as permitted a jury to say that he was, to the in-
sured, the company's agent for the collection of the initial
premium, and when he collected it and forgot to send it to
the company, the company was bound by the payment and was
guilty of wrongful cancellation when it cancelled for failure
of premium payment. In support of its ruling the Court cites
2. 229 S. C. 230, 92 S. E. 2d 647 (1956).
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two South Carolina cases3 dealing with apparent authority
in general. Additionally, American Jurisprudence is au-
thority for the specific rule which was applied here:
When an insurance company delivers a policy to an agent
to be delivered to the insured, it thus clothes such agent
with apparent authority to receive payment of at least
the first premium.
The Court decided only one other case in the field of Agency
which is of any general interest. That was Norwood v. Par-
themos5 , in which a non-resident challenged the service of
process upon him through the Highway Department on ac-
count of a claim arising out of the negligent operation of his
automobile in South Carolina. A friend of the automobile
owner's son, who was also in the car, was driving at the
time of the collision and the owner took the position that the
driver was not his agent or servant. Judge Brailsford, whose
opinion was adopted by the Supreme Court, held that the
complaint alleged agency under the South Carolina family
purpose doctrine and that constructive service upon a non-
resident automobile owner on that basis was valid. Judge
Brailsford pointed out that the family purpose doctrine ap-
plied although "the actual operation of the automobile was
by a companion of the son for whom it was maintained and
to whom it was furnished by the defendant."
3. Moore v. Hardaway Contracting Co., 193 S. C. 299, 8 S. E. 2d 511
(1940), and City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball
Club, 205 S. C. 495, 32 S. E. 2d 777 (1945).
4. 29 An:. Jur. 357, Insurance, Section 426.
5. 230 S. C. 207, 95 S. E. 2d 168 (1956).
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